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NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE 
PUBLIC-GOODS PROBLEM* 
Jeffrey Rogers H'\_mmel0 & Don Lavoie00 
1. Introduction 
National defense, according to the popular ideal, is a service provided by 
the state to its citizens. I It entails protection from aggressors outside the state's 
jurisdiction, usually foreign states. TI1e most sophisticated theoretical justification 
for government provision of this service is the public-goods argument. Roughly 
stated , this argument claims that the incentive to free -ride inhibits people from 
providing enough protection from fore ign aggression voluntarily. Thus , it is in 
people 's best interests to coerce themselves. Taxa tion is necessary to ensure 
sufficient military expenditures. 
Many opponents of arms control treat the public-goods problem as if it 
alone were sufficient to discredit any radical reduction in military spending. We, 
however, will challenge this presumption. This article will not question the validity, 
realism, or relevance of the public-goods concept.2 Indeed, we think that the core 
• We wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance o f Williamson M. Evers and joe Fuhrig in working 
out the themes of this paper. Tyler Cowen, David Friedman MarshaJ I Fritz, M. L. Rantala, David Ramsay 
Steele, Richard H. Timberlake, J r., David ]. Theroux, and Lawrence H. White all gave us h elpful 
comments upon earlier drafts. They do not necessalily share our conclusions, however, and we alone 
are responsible for any remaining errors. 
Tilis article is reprinted with permission from the book, Anns, Politics and the Economy: Historical and 
Contempormy Perspectives, edited by Robert Higgs.© Copyright 1990, The Independent Institute, 134 
Ninety-Eight Avenue, Oakland, CA 94603, U.S.A. 
0 Professor of Economics and History, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, CA. 

00 Professor of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA. 

1 By "the state" we mean government. We use the two terms interchangeably, unlike many political 

scientists, who use the term the "state" either for wha t we are calling the "nation" i.e., the government 
plus its subjects, or for some vague intt: rmedialt: entity which is less than the entire nation but more 
than just the government. We recognize tha t the sta te and its subjects can often be intricately 
interwoven into a complex web of mixed institutions, but the distinction is still fundamentaL 
2 Although we will not take u p these issues here, some economists suggest that the characteristics that 
make something a public good are a!Jnost never physically inherent in the good or service but are 
rather nearly always a conse quence of choosing one out of many feasible methods for produ cing the 
good or ser vice. See Cowen-19RS, pp. 53-63; Palmer-1983, pp. l-5, p . 11; Block-1983, pp. 1-34; 
Roth hard-1981, pp. S32-46; Goldin-1977, pp. 53-71: and Bmbaker- l 97S, pp. 147-61. 
Volume 5 , numero 2/3, }uin!Septambre 1994, pp 353-3 77. 
354 journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 
service within national defense - safety from violence and aggression - captures 

the essence of a public good more fully than economists have appreciated. But this 

essential feature, rather than providing a solid justification for heavy military 

expenditures, offers one of the most powerful objections to such a government 

policy. 

We will first reexamine the nature of national defense in order to clarify 
the underlying goal of military spending. The presumption that the state's military 
establishment automatically provides safety from aggression needs careful scrutiny. 
The taxation necessary to fuel military expansion often generates more public­
goods problems than it circumvents. This leads us to the more general question of 
how the free-rider incentive is ever overcome, despite theoretical predictions to the 
contrary. Public-goods theory seems to misunderstand human nature, by 
exaggerating the importance of narrow self-interest and confining attention to 
artificially static Prisoners' Dilemmas. A more social and dynamic model of human 
action is better able to account for the observed fact that free-rider problems are 
overcome in the real world all the time. 
2. What is a public good? 
Economists have called many things public goods and then endlessly 
debated whether the label really applies, but national defense has remained the 
quintessential public good. Although rarely discussed in detail, it is universally 
invoked as the classic representative of the public-goods category.3 
Two characteristics distinguish a pure public good from a private good, 
and both are exhibited by the case of national defense. The first is nonrival 
consumption. One customer's consumption of a marginal unit of the good or 
service does not preclude another's consumption of the same unit. For example, in 
an uncrowded theater, two patrons' enjoyment of the same movie is nonrival. The 
second characteristic is nonexcludability. The good or service cannot be provided 
to an individual customer without simultaneously providing it to others. The owner 
of a dam, for example, cannot provide flood control separately to the individual 
farmers residing downstream.4 
Although these two characteristics frequently come in conjunction with 
each other, they do not necessarily have to. Nonexcludability from the dam's 
flood-control services is accompanied by nonrival consumption of the services 
3 Examples of economists treating national defense as the quintessential public good include 

Samuelson-1976, p. 159; Buchanan/Flowers-1975, p . 27; and Head/Shoup-1969, p. 567. Among the few 

attempts of economists to look in any detail at national defense as a public good are Thompson-1974, 

pp. 755-82; and Wagner-1975, pp. 199-221. 

4 Paul A. Samuelson's two classic articles, Samuelson-1954, pp. 387-89, and Samuelson-1955, pp. 350-56, 
are generally credited as being the first formal statements of modern public-goods theory. Important 
further developments in public-goods theory include Samuelson-1958, pp. 332-38; Musgrave-1959; 
Buchanan/Kafoglis-1963, pp. 403-14; Demsetz-1964, pp. 11-26; Minasian-1964, pp. 71-80; Baumol-1965; 

McKean/Minasian-1966, pp. 14-23; Davis/Winston-1967, pp. 360-73; Buchanan-1968; Misnan-1969, 

pp. 329-48; Head/Shoup/1969; Head-1974, SnidaV1979, pp. 532-66. 
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among the various farmers, but the owner of a nearly empty theater can still 
exclude additional patrons. Ye t, according to the public-goods argument, either 
characteristic alone causes "market failure" - that is, an allocation o f resources 
that is less than Pareto optimal. Thus, either can be sufficient to justify state 
intervention.5 
Even national defense is not a pure public good. Americans in Alaska and 
Hawaii could very easily be excluded from the U.S. government's defense 
perimeter, and doing so might enhance the military value of at least conventional 
U.S. forces to Americans in the other forty-eight states. But in general, an additional 
ICBM in the U.S. arsenal can simultaneously protect everyone within the country 
without diminishing its services. In that respect, consumption of national defense is 
nonrival. Moreover, a technique that defends just a single American from the Soviet 
state without necessarily defending his or her entire community and perhaps the 
entire nation is difficult to visualize. That makes national defense nonexcludable as 
well. 
We are going to focus, however, only upon nonexcludabili ty. If 
consumption of a service is nonrival, but businessmen and entrepreneurs can 
exclude those who do not pay for it, then they still have strong incentives to 
provide the service. The most serious "market failure" that is alleged to result is 
underutilization of the service. Some people will be prevented from benefiting 
from the quantity of the service that has been produced, even though permitting 
them to do so costs nothing. Furthermore, even this imperfection will dissipate if 
the market permits discriminatory pricing. 6 
On the other hand, nonexcludability creates opportunities for free riders , 
who will pay for the service only if doing so is absolutely necessary to receive it. 
From the perspective of economic self interest, every potential customer has an 
incentive to try to be a free rider. If enough of them act on this incentive, the 
service will not be produced at all, or at least not enough of it. 
Another way to think about nonexcludability is as a positive externality in 
its purest form. Many goods and services generate additional benefits for people 
other than those who directly consume and pay for them. There is often no way for 
the producers of these goods to charge those who receive these external benefits. 
A nonexcludable good or service is one where the positive externalities are not just 
an incidental by-product but rather constitute the major benefit of the good or 
service.7 
5 Much o f the literature has co nceded that, strictly speaking, very few actual goods or se1vices exhibit 
either of the public-good characteristics in its polar form. Instead, in the real world we encounter a 
range of goods and services for which the potential capacity and qua lity of noru·ival consumption is 
increasing or for which the costs of exclusion are increasing. 
6 We have slightly understated the supposed "market failure " from nonrival consumption wi th 
excludability. The qua ntity of the public good could also be nonoptimal. There is a vast economic 
literature debating the intricacies of nonrival consumption. Some of the highlights include Samuclson­
1969b, pp. 26-30, Dcmset?.-1970, pp. 293-306; Thompson-1968, pp. 1-12; Ekelund/Hulett-1973, pp. 369­
87; Dcmsetz-1973, pp. 389-405; Oakland-1 974, pp. 927-39; Lec-1977 , pp. 403-20; Borcherding-1978, 
pp. 111-32; and llums/ Walsh-1981, pp. 166-91. 
7 On the relationship of public goods and•externalities, see Samuclson-1969a, pp. 98-123; Buchanan­
196R p. 75; Head-1974, pp. Hl4-213; and Mishan-1969. 
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Clearly, the justification for the state's provision of national defense does 
not stem from any major concern that in its absence protection services would be 
produced but underutilized. Rather, it stems from the assumption that, unless 
taxation or some other coercive levy forces people to contribute, national defense 
will be inadequately funded and therefore its core service of safety from aggression 
will be underproduced. It is this widely held but rarely examined asswnption tha t 
we wish to question. 
3. What is national defense? 
Before we ca n explore the free-ride r dynamics of the state's military 
establishment, we must clarify the meaning of the term "national defense." The 
public-goods justification for military expenditures rests upon a fundamental 
equivocation over exactly what service national defense entails. When economists 
discuss natio nal defense, the core service they usually have in mind, explicitly or 
implicitly, is protection of people's lives, property, and liberty from fore ign 
aggressors. This also appears to be what people have in mind when they fear 
foreign conquest, particularly in the case of the American fear of Soviet conquest. 
People throughout the world believe that their own government, no matter how 
disagreeable, defends them from foreign governments, which they think would be 
even more oppressive. 
This defense of the people is not synonymous with another service that 
goes under the same "national defense" label: protection of the state itself and its 
territorial integrity. Historically, the state has often embarked on military 
adventures unrelated to the defense of its subjects. If this were not the case, people 
would require no protection from foreign states in the first p lace. Many Americans 
seriously doubt that the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia had very 
much to do with protecting their liberty. One defense-budget analyst, Earl Ravena}, 
contends that nearly two-thirds of U.S. military expenditures goes toward the 
defense of wealthy allied nations in Europe and Asia and has little value for the 
defense ofAmericans. s 
The distinction between the two meanings of national defense does not 
apply only when the state engages in foreign intervention or conquest. Even 
during unambiguously defensive wars, the state often systematically sacrifices the 
defense of its subjects to the defense of itself Such universal war measures as 
conscription, confiscatory taxation, rigid economic regulation, and suppression of 
dissent aggress against the very citizens whom the state is presumably protecting. 
People believe the state defends their liberty; in fact, many end up surrendering 
much of their liberty to defend the state. 
People of course may consider some trade-off worth it. They may accept 
the costs and risks of the state's protection in order to reduce the risks and costs of 
foreign conquest. But in most discussions of national defense, the aggressive acts 
. ' ~ 
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8 Ravenal-1984. See also Russett-1970, pp. 91-126. 
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I taken by the government against itS own subjects are arbitrarily excluded from the 
discussion. It is this frequently overlooked cost which is suggested in Randolph 
Bourne's famous observation: "War is the health of the State. "9 
In other words, the national interest and the public good do not 
automatically coincide. We do not deny the possibility of an incidental relationship 
between the defense of the state and the defense of the people. But in the next 
section, we will present general reasons why we think this relationship is not as 

strong as usually supposed. Before we can do that, we must fully expose the 
conceptual gulf between the two meanings of national defense. 

The pervasive doctrine of nationalism obscures this fundamental distinction. 
Nationalism treats nations as collective entities, applying principles drawn from the 
analysis of individual interaction to the international level. In a war between two 
nations, the nationalist model focuses on essentially two parties: nation A and nation 
B. As in fights between individuals, one of these two nations is the aggressor, 
whereas the other is the defender. As a result, the model axiomatically equates 
protecting the state with protecting its subjects.
The basic flaw in the nationalist model is its collectivist premise. Although 
the model informs many of the formal economic analyses of international relations, 
it represents a glaring example of the fallacy of composition. The state simply is 

not the same thing as its subjects. Democracies are sometimes referred to as 

"governments of the people," but this is, at best, rhetorical sloppiness. The state 

and the people interpenetrate one another and in complex ways, but they clearly 

do not have exactly the same purposes or interests. 

Consequently, any conflict between two nations involves not just two 
parties, but at least four the state governing nation A, the state governing nation B, 
the people with the (mis)fortune to live under state A, and the people with 
the (mis)fortune to live under state B. Whatever the merits of a dispute between 
states A and B, the dispute need not divide a significant portion of people A from 
people B.lo 
Abandoning this collectivist identification of the State with its subjects 
exposes the critical insight about the national-defense service. If one is truly 
concerned about defense of peoples' lives, property, and liberty, then the transfer 
of their capital city from one location to another is not intrinsically significant. In 
some cases it might even be thought an improvement. Many Americans are 
convinced that the territory constituting Russia is in a very real sense already 
conquered - by the Soviet government. Some even believe that the Soviet people 
would fare better with Washington, D.C., as their capital city. What ultimately 

·matters is whether transferring the capital city brings the citizens a net loss or gain. 
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:·· 	 9 Bourne-1964, pp. 65-104. A general substantiation (or refutation) of Bourne's observation has so far 
not attracted the professional energies of any hist01ian, perhaps because they feel no need to belabor 
the obvious. There are lots of stud ies showing the growth of state power in particular countries during 

patticular wars, but vety few that even treat a single country during more than one war, or more than a 

single country during one war. A few exceptions that have come to our attention include, Rossiter-1948; 

Ekirch-1956; Higgs-1987; Tilly-1975; Tilly-1 985; and Hale-1985. 

10 We cite examples of economic models exhibiting the nationalistic fallacy of composition below. One 

of the very few written challenges to the nationalistic model is Rothbard-1974, pp. 70-80. We have 

profited greatly from this pathhreaking essay. 
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The danger therefore is not foreign conquest per se, but the amount of 
power the conquering government can successfully wield. In the final analysis, 
protection from foreign states is not a unique service. It is a subset of a more 
general service: protection from aggression by anyone- or any state. Whether we 
formally label an oppressive state "foreign" or "domestic" becomes a secondary 
consideration. 
Pe ople admittedly may highly value their own state's preservation and 
glorification, in and of itself. Their government' s m ilitary establishment may 
directly enter their utility functions, the same way their favorite baseball or football 
team does. But nationalism is not just a subjective preference. It is also a positive 
social theory, as legitimately subject to criticism for its policy recommendations as 
any other. The military's coercive funding unfortunately prevents people from 
revealing their true preferences about national defense d irectly and 
unambiguously. Some citizens may still want a huge and expensive military 
establishment even if they discover that it gives them less protection than they 
thought. But meanwhile, an examination of whether military expansion truly does 
defend p eople's lives, property, and liberty is still in order.ll 
.•: 4. The Free-Rider Dynamics of Government Intervention 
When Paul Samuelson first formalized public-goods theory , many 
economists unreflectively subscribed to what Harold Demsetz has called the 
nirvana approach to public policy. Demonstrating some "market fai lure" with 
respect to an abstract op timum was considered sufficient to justify state action. 
Economists assumed that the costless, all-knowing, and ben evolent sta te could 
simply and easily correct any failure. 
Since then, e conomists have become far more realistic. Public-goods 
theory has advanced to the point where it is now an exercise in comparative 
institutions. Demonstrating "ma rket fa ilure" is no longer sufficient. One must 
compare the market with ·the state, not as one wishes the state would behave in 
some ideal realm, but as it must behave in the real world. To justify state action, 
one must show the agents of government have the capacity and the incentive to do 
a better job than p articipants in the market. Can the state provide the public good 
without costs that exceed the benefits? And is there some incentive structure that 
would conceivably ensure that it do so?l2 
Economists within the field of public choice h ave done some of the most 
important work on the comparative capabilities of the state -by applying public­
goods insights to political action itself. They h ave come to the realization that the 
free-rider incentive does not only arise for market enterprises. As Mancur Olson 
11 For a purely formal approach to people's utility functions with regard to national defense, see 
Wagner-1975. 
12 Demsetz makes the comparison berween the "nirvana" and "comparative institutions" approaches in 
Demsetz-1969, pp. 1-3. See also Coase-1960, pp. 1-44; Buchanan-1962, pp. 17-28; and Turvey-1963 , 
pp. 309-13. ~ . ' 
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has demonstrated, the free-rider incentive can arise for any group, especially 
political groups wanting to influence state policy. This imparts an inherent public­
goods character to all political decisions.l3 
Assume that one of us wishes to change some .state policy that we 
personally find particularly onerous - for instance, to repeal a tax. We are 
members of a fairly large group that will benefit if the tax is repealed. If enough of 
us contribute money, time, or other resources to bringing about the tax's repeal, 
we wiH succeed and all be better off. The money we save in taxes will more than 
reimburse us for our effort. Once the tax is repealed, however, even those who did 
not join our campaign will no longer have to pay it. We cannot exclude them from 
the benefits of the tax's repeal. They will be free-riders on our political efforts. 
Just as in the case of a nonexcludable good in the market, every potential 
beneficiary of the tax repeal has an incentive, from the perspective of economic 
self-interest, to try to be a free-rider. If enough of them act according to this 
incentive, the tax will never be repealed. Public choice economists call this result 
"government failure," completely analogous to the "market failu re" caused by 
nonexcludability. 
Of course, this example grossly oversimplifies the problem. Under a 
democratic state, people do not directly purchase changes in state policy; they vote 
for them. Or more precisely, some of them vote for representatives who then vote 
on and bargain over state policy. If the tax repeal example were completely 
accurate, nearly every intentional benefit provided by the state would be a pure 
private good, similar to the current salaries of politicians and bureaucrats. With 
voting, political entrepreneurs and vote maximizing firms (which are called 
political parties) have some incentive to provide us with our tax repeal, even if we 
do not politically organize, in order to entice us to vote for them.14 
This incentive, however, is not very great. First of all, voting itself gives rise 
to a public good. An individual must expend time and other resources to vote, but 
he or she can avoid these expenditures by free-riding on the voting of others. Only 
in the very remote case where the voter anticipates that, a single vote will decide 
the election's outcome does this incentive to free -ride disappear. Consequently, the 
political entrepreneur must have some reason to expect that we will vote at all. 
And if we do in fact vote, he must in addition have some reason to expect that the 
tax repeal, among all the other competing issues, will affect how we vote. Our 
forming a political organization to repeal the tax gives him reason to believe both 
these things.15 
In short, unorganized groups have some influence upon the policies of a 
democratic state. But other things being equal, groups that organize and campaign 
for policies have a significant advantage. That is presumably why they organize 
13 Downs-1957; Buchanan/rullock-1962; Olson-1971; Niskanen-1971 ; Tullock-1967; Breton-1974 ; and 
~,fcker-1983, pp. 372-80. 
Wagner-1966, pp. 161-70; and Frohlich-1971 , stress the political-entrepreneur thesis. Olson responds 
briefly in the second e dition of The Logic ofCollective Action, pp. 174-75. Bany-1978, pp. 37-40, and 
~rdin-1982, pp. 35-37, go into the weakness of this thesis in greater detail. 
 Extended discussions of the outcome of voting as a public good indude Barzei/ Silberberg-1973, 
pp. 51-58; Meehl -1977, pp. 11-30; Bucbanan/Brennan-1984, pp. 185-201; and Barry-1978, pp. 13·19. 
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and campaign. It strains credulity to suppose that all the people who pour vast 
ums of money into political lobbying are utterly mistaken in the belief that they 
hereby gain some leverage on policy. The common observation that special 
nterests have inordinate influence upon a democratic state is without doubt 
mpirically well founded. 
Two variables affect the likelihood that a group will overcome the 
reerider problem and successfully organize. These variables operate whether the 
roup is trying to attain nonexcludable benefits on the market or from the state. · 
he first is the size of the group. The smaller the group, ceteris paribus, the more 
ikely the members are to organize successfully. The larger the group, the more 
ifficult it is to involve enough of them to secure the public good. 
The second variable is the difference between the value of the public good 
o the members of the group and the cost to them. The greater this difference, 
eteris paribus, the more likely they are to organize successfully. Indeed, if this 
ifference is great enough, one single member might benefit enough to be willing 
o pay the entire cost and let all the other members of the group free-ride. The 
maller this difference, on the other hand, the more essential becomes the 
ontribution of each potential member.16 
The democratic state therefore makes it much easier to enact policies that 
unnel g reat benefits to small groups than to enact policies that shower small 
enefits on large groups. Because of this free-rider-induced "government failure" 
he state has the same problem in providing non excludable goods and services as 
he . market ­ with one crucial difference . When a group successfully provides 
tself a public good through the market, the resources it expends pay directly for 
he good. In contrast, when a group successfully provides itself a public good 
hrough the state, the resources it expends pay only the overhead cost of 
nfluencing state policy. The state then finances the public good through taxa tion 
r some coercive substitute. 
Moreover; the group that campaigned for the state-provided public good 
ill not in all likelihood bear very much of the coerced cost of the good. 
therwise, they would have had no incentive to go through the state, because 
oing so then costs more in total than simply providing themselves the good 
oluntarily. Instead, the costs will be widely distributed among the poorly 
rganized large group, who may not benefit at all from the public good. 
This makes it possible for organized groups to get the state to provide 
ogus public goods, goods and services which in fact cost much more than the 
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16 One of the clearest expositions of these factors appears in David Friedman's neglected Friedman­
1973, pp. 185-88. See also Friedman-1986, pp. 440-47. Olson's taxonomy of groups - privileged 
(small); intermediate, and latent (large) ­ in 7be Logic of Collective Action treats the two factors -
group size and relative cost of the public good - simultaneously and thereby slightly confuses the 
issue. Hardin-1982, pp. 38-42, clarifies Olson's taxonomy, correctly pointing out that a privileged group 
(one in which a single member values the public good enough to pay its entire cost) could theoretically 
be quite large. 
Admittedly, there is some ambiguity about which cetera remain pares when group size is varied. Some 
scholars have consequently challenged the claim that larger groups have greater difficulty overcoming 
the free-rider incentive. See Frohlich/Oppenheimer-1970, pp. 104-20; Chamberlin-1974, pp. 707..J.6; and 
McGuire-1974, pp. 107-26. The best resolution of these questions is Hardin-1982, pp. 42-49, pp. 125-37. 
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' beneficiaries would be willing to pay even if exclusion w ere possible and they 
could not free-ride . In this manner, the state generates externalities, and ones that 
are negative . Rather than overcoming the free -rider problem, the state benefits 
free -loaders, who receive bogus public goods at the expense of the taxpayers. 
Provision of these goods and services moves the economy away from, not toward,
Pareto optimality. When the bogusness of such public goods is obvious enough, 
economists call them transfers. 
What is the upshot of this "government failure" for national defense? In the 
case of defending the state itself, we are dealing quite clearly with a service that the 
state has enormous incentives to provide. If this is a nonexcludable good or service 
at all, then it is a public good that benefits small groups very highly. But in the case 
of defending the people, we are talking about, in the words of David Friedman, "a 
public good ... with a very large public." The benefits, although potentially great, 
are dispersed very broadly.17 
Thus, to the extent that the free-rider obstacle inhibits market protection of 
liberty, it raises an even more difficult obstacle to the state's ever undertaking that 
vital service. The state has strong incentives to provide national defense that 
protects itself and its prerogatives, but it has very weak incentives to provide 
national defense that protects its subjects' lives, property, and liberty. This explains 
the common historical divergence between defending the state and defending the 
people. 
Furthermore, there is a perverse inverse relationship between the people's 
belief that the state defends them and the reality. To the extent that they accept this 
nationalistic conclusion, their political resistance against the domestic state's 
aggression, however weak because of the public-goods problem to begin with, 
decreases further. This is most noticeable during periods of actual warfare. The 
belief of the state's subjects that it provides protection actually reduces the amount 
of protection they enjoy, at least against the domestic state. 
Nationalism thus results in an ironic paradox. It views the state as a 
protection agency, but this very view contributes to the possibility that the state 
will take on the literal role of a protection racket. Those who decline to p ay for the 
state's protection become its victims. This in tum gives the state an added incentive 
to find foreign enemies. For without a foreign threat, the justification for the state's 
protection becomes far less persuasive. IS 
Our remarks have thus far been confined to the democratic state. They 
apply, however, even more strikingly to the undemocratic state, insofar as there is 
aq.y significant difference between the political dynarrucs of the two types. We 
believe that many economists have overemphasized the operative significance of 
J 	
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17 Friedman-1973. p. 189. Lee-1985, p. 46, makes the same obseJVation abou t the political production of 
national defense, but because he does not recognize the dilitinction between defending the state and 
defending the people , he arrives at a much different conclusion: viz., democratic states w ill 
u nderprod uce military defense relative to undemocratic states. 
18 A similar point is mad e by Boulding-1963, pp. 3-27. He refers to the world's competing military 
organizations as "milorgs" and insists that, in contrast to any other social enterprise (including police 
.Protection), military organizations generate their own demand. "The only justification for the existence 
of a milorg is the existence of another milorg in some other place .... A police force is not justified by the 
~existence ofa police force in anmher town, d1at is, by ~mother institution of the same kind" (p. 10). 
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formal voting. Both types of states are subject to the influence of groups that 
marshal resources in order to affect policy. Formal voting only makes it possible 
for some changes to manifest themselves faster and less painfully. 
Our argument does not rule out the possibility that the state might actually 
defend its subjects. Whereas the difference between the political dynamics of 
democratic and undemocratic states is overdrawn, states do differ markedly in the 
amount of aggression they commit against their own subjects. If we automatically 
assume that a conquering government can wield as much power over foreign· 
populations as it does over its domestic subjects, then a relatively less oppressive 
government will, in the process of defending itself, provide some protection for its 
subjects. But this is often only an unintended positive externality. 
Moreover, a military policy designed primarily to defend the state's 
prerogatives will generally differ from what would be sufficient for the protection 
of its subjects. This difference may unnecessarily involve the people in dangerous 
military commitments and adventures. Their lives, liberty, and property, beyond 
being sacrificed to the interests of the domestic state, will then be at greater risk 
from foreign governments as well. Even when countering oppressive governments, 
national defense therefore generates negative externalities that may more than 
offset the possible positive externality. 
Above all, the value of this defense hinges entirely upon the assumption 
that conquering governments can oppress a foreign population more fully and 
easily than can that population's domestic government. But this assumption is 
highly simplistic. It treats the power of the state as exogenously determined. Yet, if 
our concern is for the protection of people's lives, property, and liberty from any 
state, then a state's oppressiveness becomes the most critical variable of all. One 
state's military policy might not only directly affect the liberty of its own subjects, 
but it might also indirectly influence the power of opposing states. Only a more 
sophisticated under-standing of oppression's fundamental determinants can tell us 
how best to ward off foreign aggression. 
6. The free-rider dynamics of social consensus 
To this point, our conclusions have been somewhat pessimistic, justifying 
Earl Brubaker's observation that the free-rider assumption makes economics a 
dismal science.19 Based on that assumption, neither the market nor the state has 
much incentive to provide any direct protection of peoples' lives, property, and 
liberty. To the extent that historical accident has resulted in marked differences in 
the power ofvarious states over tqeir own subjects, some such protection might be 
produced as an unintended externality of the state's effort to protect its own 
territorial integrity. But that very effort at self-protection will also have a significant 
countervailing negative impact on the degree to which the state aggresses against 
its own subjects. 
' ­
•' 
i · 
19 Brubaker-1975, p. 153. 
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Attributing a difference to historical accident, however, is simply another 
way of saying that the difference is unexplained. Not' until we explain the marked 
differences in domestic power of the world's states will we fully comprehend the 
relationship between protecting the state and protecting the people . 
One naive explanation common among economists is the public-goods 
theory of the state. This theory often rests upon a sharp dichotomy between two 
types of states, usually democratic and undemocratic . Undemocratic states 
according to this theory are little better than criminal gangs, run by single despots 
or small groups of oligarchs essentially for their own personal ends. The subjects of 
these states suffer under their rulers but can do very little about their plight. Any 
effort on their part to change the situation, whether through violent revolution or 
other means, produces an outcome that is a public good; again, we are caught in 
the free-rider trap.20 
Democratic states, in contrast, are the result of social contracts. According 
to the public-goods theory of the state, people create democratic states to solve the 
free -rider problem. At some obscure moment in the past, they drew up 
constitutional rules in which they agreed to be coerced in order to provide public 
goods for themselves. Over time, because the freerider problem genefates 
"government failure," democratic states have a tendency to fall under the influence 
of special interests. Perhaps better constitutional decision rules could alleviate this 
decay. Nonetheless, democratic states always retain vestiges of their public-goods 
origin. That is why they aggress against their own subjects far less than do 
undemocratic states. 21 
We do not have to turn to the readily accessible historical evidence to 
refute this naive theory about the origin of democratic states. The theory's 
proponents quite often do not literally believe it. Instead, tl1ey view the theory as 
merely explaining the conceptual nature rather than the concrete origin of the 
democratic state. Either way, however, the theory has an inner contradiction. 
Creating a democratic state of this nature is a public good itself. A very large group 
must in some manner have produced it. Because of the free-rider problem, they 
have no more incentive to do that than to revolt against an undemocratic state or to 
provide tl1emselves an y other nonexcludable benefit.22 
A more realistic alternative to the public-goods theory of the state is what 
we can call the socialconsensus theory of the state. All states are legitimized 
monopolies on coercion. The crucial word is "legitimized." This legitimization is 
hat diffe rentiates states from mere criminal gangs. Any society in, which people 
efrain from regularly killing each other enjoys some kind of social consensus. No 
overnment rules through brute force alone, no matter how undemocratic. Enough 
w
r
g
2°For the argument that revolution is a public good, see Tullock-1971, pp. 89·99, which became with 
minor alterations one of the chapters of his book, Tullock-1974 . Tullock distinguishes between what be 
calls "exploitative" and "cooperative• governments, rather than democratic and undemocratic, but the 
two classifications are almost identical. . 
21 
The public-goods theory of the democratic state is still stated best in Baumoi-J 965, p. 57. 22 
Kalt-1981, pp. 565-84, pinpoints the contradiction in the public-goods theory of the state. 111e still 
devastating, classic, point-by-point refutation of the social contract remains Spooncr-1966. See a lso 
Eve rs-1977, pp. lflS-94, which traces the literal notion of a social contrat't all the way back to Socra tes. 
I 
I 
I364 joumat des Economistes et des Etudes lfumaines 
I 
of its subjects must accept it as necessary or desirable for its ru le to be widely 
enforced and observed. But the very consensus which legitimizes the state also 
hinds it.23 
The social consensus bears little resemblance to the mythical social 
contract of public-goods theory. Whereas the social contract is generally conceived 
of as an intentional political agreement, agreed upon explicitly at some specific 
moment, the social consensus is an unintended societal institution, like language, 
evolving implicitly over time. Sometimes, the evolution of the social consensus can 
be very violent. Often, particular individuals or even fairly large groups will 
strongly disagree with certain features of their society's consensus. But at all times, 
members of society are socialized into the consensus in ways that they only dimly 
grasp, if at all. 24 
Consider a classroom filled with average American citizens. Ask for a show 
of hands on the following question: how many would pay their taxes in full if no 
p enalties resulted from nonpayment? Very few would raise their hands. This shows 
that taxation is involuntary. Then ask the group a second question: how many 
think taxes are necessary or just? This time, nearly every hand would go up. This 
shows that taxation is legitimized.2 5 
Of course, one of the reasons Americans generally view taxation as 
legitimate is because they think it is necessary in order to provide public goods. All 
this proves, however, is that, although the public-goods theory of the state is 
utterly worthless as an objective description of the state's origin or nature, it is very 
valuable as an ideological rationalization for the state's legitimization. It performs a 
function analogous to that performed by the divine right of kings under 
monarchical states or by Marxist dogma under Communist states. 
The social-consensus theory of the state suggests that if you conducted the 
same survey about taxation upon a group of average Russ ians living within the 
Soviet Union, or a group of average Iranians living under the Ayatollah (and you 
could guarantee them complete immunity regardless of how they answered), you 
would get similar results. These foreign and "evil" undemocratic states are not 
exogenous a nd alien institutions imposed on their subjects by sheer terror. They 
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23 Since the definition of the stare (or government) is something political scientists cannot even agree 
pon, ours will obviously be controversial. By "legitimized" (a positive adjective), we of course do not 
ean "legitimate" (a normativ e adjective). Most economi'srs should have no difficulty conceiving of the 
tate as a monopolistic coercive institution, but noneconomisrs might balk. Members of the general 
ublic appear to have a bifurcated definition of the state, depending on whether it is domestic or 
oreign . They view hostile foreign states as simply monopolies on coercion, just like c1iminal gangs, 
hich is why they fear foreign conquest. They overlook the legitimization of these states. On the other 
and, that is the only element they seem to recognize about the domestic state, overlooking or at least 
eemphasizing the coercive element. This dichotomy is only a cmder version of the distinction made by 

ublic-goods theory between democratic and undemocratic states. For an extended defense of the 

mplications of our universal definition, see Rorhbt~rd-1974, pp. 34-53. . 

4 One of the earliest observations that a social consensus alujays legitimizes the state is Ia Boetie-1975. 
ther writers who have since put forward a social-consensus theory of the state include David Hume, 
ume-1963, pp. 29-34; Mises-1966, pp. 177-90; and Sharp-1973. 

5 We are confident about the empirical results, having conducted the test ourselves many times. 
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are complex products of the culture, attitudes, preferences, and ideas, whether 
explicit or implicit, t~at prevail within their societies.26 
The vast ideological and cultural differences among the peoples of the 
world are what explain the marked differences in the domestic power of their 
states. The consensual constraints upon states differ in content, but all states face 
them. The Soviet leaders fully realize this, which is why they devote so many 
resources to domestic and foreign propaganda. The shifting social consensus also 
explains the many changes in the form and power of the state over time. Although 
professional economists tend to ignore the ideological and cultural components of 
social dynamics, professional historians give these factors the bulk of their attention. 
History records that in the not-so-distant past the world was entirely in the 
grip of undemocratic states, which permitted their subjects very little liberty. 
Democratic states evolved from undemocratic states. States· that now must tolerate 
a large degree of liberty emerged from states that did not have to do so. Public­
goods theory is in the awkward position of theoretically denying that this could 
have happened. It raises an across-the board theoretical obstacle to every 
conceivable reduction in state power that benefits more than a small group of 
individuals. 2.7 The social-consensus theory, in contrast, attributes this slow 
progress, sometimes punctuated with violent revolutions and wars, to ideological 
changes within the social consensus. 
Thus, history is littered with drastic changes in state power and policy that 
resulted from successful ideological surmountings of the free-rider obstacle. The 
Minutemen volunteers who fought at .Concord Bridge could not even come close 
to charging all the beneficiaries of their action. They produced tremendous 
externalities from which Americans are still benefiting today. The Abolitionist 
movement produced such a cascade of positive externalities that chattel slavery 
a labor system that was one of the world's mainstays no Jess than two hundred 
years ago, and had been so for millennia - has been rooted out everywhere 
28 across the entire globe. We could multiply the examples endlessly.
Indeed, the existence of any voluntary ethical behavior at all faces a free­
rider obstacle. Society is much more prosperous if we all cease to steal and cheat, 
but the single individual is better off still if everyone else behaves ethically while 
he or she steals and cheats whenever able to get away with it. Thus, everyone has 
a powerful personal incentive to free-ride on other people's ethical behavior. If we 
all succumbed to that incentive, society would not be possible at all. 
­
26 Zaslavsky-198.3, has actually conducted fair!}' reliable surveys among Soviet subjects, which indicate 
quite unambiguously that the Soviet state is legitimized. Good single-volume histoties that impart an 
appreciation for the domestic sources of the Soviet state are Daniels-1985, and Hosking-1985. An 
introduction to the various interpretations of Soviet hist01y by American scholars, written from a 
revisionist slant, is Cohen-1985. 
27 This awkward position is clearest in Tullock's Social Dilemma. The new Society for Interpretive 
Economics, codirected by Lavoie/Klamer (Economics Department, George Mason University) is a 
welcome exception to the geneml neglect among economists of cul tural and ideological dynamics. We 
also cite some specific exceptions below. 
28 The premier work on the role of ideas in the American Revolution is Bailyn-1967, while a work that 
explores the international repercussions of the revolution is Palmer-1959-64. A magisterial survey of the 
international history of chattel slavery is Davis-1984. On the emergence of the international abolitionist 
movement, see his Davis-1975. 
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We must avoid the mistaken impression that the government's police 
forces and courts are what prevents most stealing and cheating. To begin with, the 
initial creation of such a police and court system (at least under government 
auspices) is another public good. But far more important, the police and courts are 
only capable of handling the recalcitrant minority, who refuse voluntarily to obey 
society's norms. A cursory glance at varying crime rates, over time and across 
locations, clearly indicates that the total stealing and cheating in society is far from 
solely a fun ction of the resources devoted to the police and the courts. Certain 
neighborhoods are less safe, making an equal unit of police protection less 
effective, because they contain more aspiring ethical free-riders. If all members of 
society or even a substantial fraction became ethical free-riders, always stealing 
and cheating whenever they thought they could get away with it, the police and 
court system would collapse under the load. 29 
In short, every humanitarian crusade, every broad-based ideological 
movement, every widely practiced ethical system, religious and non-religious, is a 
defiant challenge hurled at the neoclassical economist's justification for state 
provision of public goods. The steady advance of the human race over the 
centuries is a series of successful surmountings of the free-rider obstacle. 
Civilization itself would be totally impossible unless people had somehow 
circumvented the public-goods problem.30 
7. Beyond the free-rider incentive 
If what we have been saying so far is even partly correct, there must be a 
serious flaw in public-goods theory. Howard Margolis points out that "no society 
we know could function" if a ll its members actually behaved as the free-rider 
assumption predicts they will. He calls this theoretical failure freerider "overkill".31 
Despite this flaw, public-goods theory explains a great deal, which is why 
it remains so popular among economists. It explains why so many eligible voters 
do not waste their time going to the polls. But it fails to explain why so many of 
them still do go. (We think an interesting empirical study would be to determine 
what percentage of economists who accept public-goods theory violate their 
theoretical assumptions about human behavior by voting.) It explains why the 
progress of civilization has been so painfully slow. But it fails to explain why we 
observe any progress at all. 
29 Among the economists who recognize the public-goods nature of ethical behavior are Buchanan­
1965, pp. 1-13, and Buchanan-1975, pp. 123-29; McKenzie-1977, pp. 208-21; and Notth-1981, pp. 11-12, 

18-19, 45-46. See also Parfit-1984. 

30 Rothbard-1981, p. 545, makes a similar observation: "Thus the free-rider argument proves hr too 

much. After all, civillzation itself is a process of all of us 'free-riding' on the achievements of others. We 

all free-ride, every day, on the achievements of Edison, Beethoven, or Vermeer." 

31 Margolis-1982, p. 6. See also McMillan-1979, pp. 95-107, Smith -1980 , pp. 584-99 and 
Schneider/Pommerehne-1981, pp. 689-704. 
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Before we work out the implications of this theoretical flaw for the issue of 
national defense, let us digress briefly and try to identify it. It must involve some 
weakness in the theory's assumption about human behavior. We make no 
pretensions, however, to being able fully to resolve the .weakness. Because this 
very issue sits at the conjunction of public-goods theory and game theory, it has 
become one of the most fertile areas of inquiry within economics and political 
science over the last decade. All we can do is modestly offer some tentative 
thoughts about the sources of the weakness. 
Two possibilities suggest themselves. Either people do not consistently 
pursue the ends that the free-rider assumption predicts they will pursue, or they 
pursue those ends but using means inconsistent with the assumption. We will take 
up both of these possibilities in order: 
1. Do people consistently pursue their self-interest, as the free-rider 
assumption defines self-interest? Public-goods theorists have offered not one but 
two motives that should cause a person to behave In accordance with the free­
rider assumption. The most obvious is narrow economic self-interest. This end 
does provide a sufficient reason to free-ride, but visualizing someone choosing a 
different end is quite easy. Simple altruism is not the only alternative that will 
violate this narrow assumption. People may desire social improvements - libetty, 
justice, peace, etc. - not simply for their material benefits, but as ends in and of 
themselves, independently present within their utility functions. Patrick Henry may 
have been engaging in political hyperbole when he exclaimed "Give me liberty or 
give me death!", but he was still expressing a willingness to pay more for attaining 
liberty than its narrow economic returns would cover. Perhaps this willingness 
should be called ideological; no matter what we call it, it appears to be quite 
common in human history.32 
Mancur Olson is the most prominent public-goods theorist to argue that a 
second motive beyond narrow economic self-interest justifies the freerider 
assumption. This second motive applies even to the individual with ideological 
ends - ifthe group is large enough. He contends that only rationality in the 
plirsuit of whatever end the individual chooses is strictly necessary. The individual 
will still choose to free-ride, because for a public good requiring a large group his 
meager contribution will have no perceptible effect on attaining the end.33 
We could object that an individual 's contribution to a cause is often not 
contingent in any way upon the cause's overall success. Consequently, how much 
the individual thinks his action will affect the probability of success is often 
32 Several scholars are moving in this direction. For instance, Dawes-1980, pp. 169-93; Brubaker-1984, 
P~- 536-53; Bany-1978; Higgs-1987, chapter 3; and North-1981, chapter 5. Even Mancur Olson suggests 
thts approach in Olson-1968, pp. 96-118, which contrasts economics, the study of rational action, with 
sociology, the study of socialization. But the most ambitious effort along these lines is Margolis-1981, 
pp. 265-79. 
We ~hould note that we attach the adj ective "narrow" to the term "self-interest" to indicate the ~tsage 
that tnvolves seeking particular, usually selfish, goals. This is to distinguish it from the broader usage of 
the term, which can encompass any goal, including altruism. Whether individuals do in fact pursue their 
~:rro_~ self-interest is a question subject to empirical veri fication or falsification, bllt individuals by 
fint!ton always pursue their broad self-imerest. 33 Olson-1971, pp. 64-6S. 
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irrelevant. Some people refuse to litter, for instance, fully aware that their refusal 
will have no perceptible impact on the quantity of litter. Such individuals gain 
satisfaction from doing what they believe is proper, regardless of its macro-impact. 
In addition to a sense of righteousness, ideological movements can offer their 
participants a sense of solidarity, of companionship in a cause, that keeps many 
loyal no matter how hopeless the cause.34 
But this objection concedes far too much to Olson. As philosopher Richard 
Tuck has cogently pointed out, Olson's notion of "rationality" if consistently 
obeyed precludes some everyday activities. It does not just apply to an individual's 
contribution to the effort of a large group; it applies just as forcefully to the 
cumulative actions of a single person on a large individual project. Olson's 
"rationality" is simply a modern variant of the ancient philosophical paradox of the 
Sorites. In one version, the paradox argues that there can never be a heap of 
stones. One stone does not constitute a heap, nor does the addition of one stone to 
something that is not already a heap. Therefore, no matter how many stones are 
added, they will never constitute a heap. (Of course, in the other direction, this 
paradox argues that there can never be anything but a heap of stones.) 
One more dollar will not make a perceptible difference in a person's life 
savings. One day's exercise will not make a perceptible difference in a person's 
health. If the fact that the individual's imperceptible contribution goes toward a 
group rather than an individual effort is what is decisive, then we are simply back 
again at the motive of narrow self-interest. No doubt, this type of "rationality" does 
influence some people not to undertake some actions under some circumstances. 
But just how compelling people find it is demonstrated by the millions who vote in 
presidential elections, despite the near certainty that the outcome will never be 
decided by one person's vote.35 
2. Do people pursue their self-interest but in a manner inconsistent with 
the free-rider assumption? Olson, again, has suggested one way that individuals 
might effectively organize despite the free-rider obstacle. Groups can link their 
efforts at achieving nonexcludable benefits with excludable by-products. Such by­
products include low group-rate insurance and professional journals. The incentive 
provided by these by-products h elps counteract the incentive to be a free rider.36 
,, 
. 
34 Higgs-1987, chapter 3, heavily emphasizes the role of ideological solidarity. Coleman-1966, pp. 49-62, 
postulates an individual's psychic investment in collective entities. Buchanan and Brennan, "Voter 
Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives," think that this symbolic identification is the major motivation 
behind voting. 
35 Tuck-1979, pp. 147-56. We can salvage Olsonian "rationality" under two strict conditions. When(!) a 
threshold level of resources is necessary before any of the public good becomes available whatsoever, 
and (2) people ·end up paying wha tever resources they contribute , irrespective of whether they reach 
the threshold or not, it becomes rational not to contribute if a person predicts that the threshold will not 
be reached. In that special case, he or she would simply be throwing away resources for nothing. 
Notice that these two conditions apply more frequently to obtaining public goods through politics ­
which is often a win-or-lose, ali-or-nothing, situation - t11an to obtaining public goods on the market. 
In particular, it applies to voting. Hardin-1982 pp. 55-61, analyzes the first of these conditions, for which 
he employs the term "step goods." 
36 Olson-1971, pp. 132-68. Olson also refers to excludable "by-products" as "selective incentives." 
Looked at another way. the byproduct theory converts a full public good into a positive externality of a 
private good. 
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Prisoner's Dilemmas, with two or more people, cooperation frequently becomes 
rational for even the most narrowly self-interested individual. What this work 
implies is that in many real-world dynamic contexts, ideological a ltruism or some 
similar motive beyond narrow self-interest may not be necessary at all to 
counterbalance the freerider incentive.40 
8. Conclusion 
We have seen that putting domestic limitations upon the power of the state 
is a public-goods problem, but nonetheless one that in many historical instances 
for whatever reason has been solved. We have also seen that national defense, in 
the sense of protecting the people from a foreign state, is a subset of the general 
problem of protecting them from any state, domestic or foreign. 
Because of "government failure," the domestic military establishment itself 
can become the greatest threat to the lives, property, and liberty of the state's 
subjects. The danger from military expansion, moreover, is not confined to its 
domestic impact. By threatening the opposing nation, it cannot even unambiguously 
guarantee greater international safety. The same threat that deters can also provoke 
the opposing side's military expansion. 
Perhaps the factors that already provide protection from the domestic state 
are the very factors to which we should turn for protection from foreign states. The 
same social consensus that has voluntarily overcome the free-rider obstacle to 
make the United States one of the freest, if not the freest, nation may be able to 
overcome the free,.rider obstacle to protect American freedom from foreign states. 
· Nearly all ofus desire a world in which all states have been disarmed. 
Of course, most of the formal economic models of international relations 
are not very sanguine about this eventuality. Yet our analysis points to two 
possible shortcoini.ngs in such models and suggests at least a glimmer of hope. 
First, they are generally built upon a static formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma, 
whereas dynamic formulations are more realistic and more likely to yield 
cooperative outcomes. Second, they generally commit the nationalistic fallacy of 
composition, ignoring the interactions of the state with its own and foreign 
populations. Like the public-goods theory they emulate, these models are very 
good at explaining the cases where disarmament fails. They do not do so well at 
explaining the cases where it succeeds- as for instance, along the U.S.-Canada 
border since 1871.41 
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40 Hardin-1971, pp. 472-81; Taylor-1976; Hardin-1982; and Axelrod-1984. Axelrod corifines himself to 
two-person dynamic Prisoner's Dile mmas, while both Taylor and Hardin consider n-person iterated 
games. For a good review of the growing literature on n-person games, see Dawes, "Soda) Dilemmas." 
41 Britain and the United States demilitarized the Great Lakes in the RushBagot Treaty of 1817. The 
process of disarming the entire border was not complete until 1871, however. Both Noel-Baker-1951:1, 
and Boulding-1963 appreciate the significance of this example. Economic studies of international 
relations that share these weaknesses include l.ee-1985 and Tullock-1974 . Most of the economic work in 
these areas has focused upon alliances. See for instance Olson-1966, pp. 266-79; Olson/Zeckhauser­
1967, pp. 25-63, Sandler-1 975, pp. 223-39; and Sandler-_1978. 
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The domestic production of disarmament is itself a public good, 
confronting the same free-rider obstacle that confronts every nonexcludable good 
and service. Should a majority in any one nation come to endorse this policy, the 
narrow - or not so narrow - special interests who benefit from an armed state 
would undoubtedly be willing to commit vast resources to keeping a huge military 
establishment. Thus, like all significant gains in the history of civilization, the 
disarming of the state could only be accomplished by a massive ideological surge 
that surmounts the free-rider obstacle. 
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